

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of LUKE DANIEL PRITT, MICHAEL  
LEE PRITT and JULIAN MICHAEL PRITT, Minors.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

MICHAEL ALAN PRITT,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

SHERRI LEE PINKOWSKI and GEORGE  
WASHINGTON JOHNSON,

Respondents.

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Before: McDonald, P.J., and Sawyer and White, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-appellant appeals by delayed leave granted the family court order terminating his parental rights to minor Julian Michael Pritt under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.

Respondent-appellant claims that the family court erred in terminating his parental rights because petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child. We disagree. Although the juvenile code requires that services be offered to facilitate reunification and any additional services the court may order, petitioner is not required to offer every conceivable service that may be available before termination may be ordered. MCL 712A.18f; MSA 27.3178(598.18f) and MCL 712A.19; MSA 27.3178(598.19). Here, the evidence establishes that petitioner offered respondent-appellant numerous different services, but that respondent-appellant failed to avail himself of many of the services

offered to him. Respondent-appellant does not indicate what additional services should have been offered. There was no error.

Respondent-appellant also argues that petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the child. In *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 354; 603 NW2d 787 (2000), our Supreme Court recently held that MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5), the statutory best interest provision, does not expressly assign any party the burden of producing best interest evidence and rejected this Court's characterization of § 19b(5) in *In re Hall-Smith*, 222 Mich App 470, 472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997), as imposing a burden of production on the party opposing termination. The Supreme Court also held that § 19b(5) does not impose any further burden of proof on the petitioner once the petitioner has carried its burden of establishing one or more statutory grounds for termination, and that the trial court may consider evidence introduced by any party when determining whether termination is clearly not in a child's best interests. *Id.*, slip op at 11-14. The evidence presented in this case did not establish that termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests.

Finally, in his statement of jurisdiction, respondent-appellant asserts that the trial court's decision was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and should be reversed. To the extent respondent-appellant is challenging the trial court's determination that a statutory ground for termination was established, the issue is not properly before us because respondent-appellant cites no authority and provides no argument on this issue. A party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claim. *In re Hamlet (After Remand)*, 225 Mich 505, 521; 571 NW2d 750 (1997). Further, the issue is not raised in respondent-appellant's statement of questions presented. *Hilliard v Schmidt*, 231 Mich App 316, 318; 586 NW2d 263 (1998).

Affirmed.

/s/ Gary R. McDonald

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Helene N. White